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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE-
1954 TENNESSEE SURVEY
CLYDE L BALL*
Most of the criminal law cases in the Tennessee courts during the
past year have dealt with matters of procedure. The basic principles
derived from these cases are treated in the Procedure and Evidence
article of this 1954 Survey.' However, those cases of especial interest
and significance will be considered here in somewhat greater detail. In
addition to procedural matters there were a few cases which turned
on concepts basic in the substantive law of crimes.
S BSTANTI LAW
Homicide: Tennessee has enunciated and followed a rule which
states that driving an automobile while intoxicated is an act malum
in se, and that when this act results in the death of a human being, the
drunken driver is criminally responsible without further showing of
facts to establish criminal negligence.2 This rule was extended in the
case of Reed v. States to cover a driver, not intoxicated, who de-
liberately tried to pass another vehicle in the face of heavy oncoming
traffic.
The recent case of Smith v. State4 involved facts substantially
identical with the Reed case. Smith was proceeding in heavy traffic
at the unreasonable speed of 60-65 miles per hour (the speed limit at
the particular point was 45 miles per hour). In order to avoid striking
a car in front of him, he swerved to his left into the path of an oncom-
ing car, and one person was killed in the resulting collision. The court
affirmed a conviction of involuntary manslaughter on the grounds that
the accused was guilty of criminal negligence. Though the court
quoted with approval from Reed v. State, with its malum in se theory,
the decision was based solely on the finding of criminal negligence.
It has been suggested that this decision may be an indication that
Tennessee is ready to retreat from its somewhat extreme and un-
satisfactory malum in se theory.5 This may be a proper inference;
however, it should be noted that in Reed v. State the accused ap-
*Assistant Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; Faculty Editor,
VanderbiLt Law Review; member, Tennessee Bar.
1. See Morgan, Procedure and Evidence-954 Tennessee Survey, infra
p. 895.
2. Keller v. State, 155 Tenn. 633, 299 S.W. 803, 59 A.L.R. 685 (1927), 41
HARv. L. REV. 669 (1928); sec Warren, Criminal Law and Procedure-1953
Tennessee Survey, 6 VANm. L. REv. 1179-80 (1953).
3. 172 Tenn. 73, 110 S.W.2d 308 (1937).
4. 264 S.W.2d 803 (Tenn. 1954).
5. See 23 TENN. L. R.v. 438 (1954).
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parently deliberately pulled out to pass without being faced with any
sudden necessity or peril-a deliberate disregard of the possible
serious consequences of his act-whereas in Smith v. State the act of
the accused in pulling into the left lane came about as the result of a
perilous situation into which his antecedent negligence had placed
him. This distinction is critical enough to take the Smith case com-
pletely out of the purview of the malum in se doctrine, and thus to
negative any inference that the Tennessee Supreme Court is question-
ing. its *previous rulings.
A later case, Rogers v. State,6 involved the question of malice. The
accused voluntarily became quite drunk, and then drove his auto-
mobile on the wrong side of the road at a speed of 60-70 miles per 'hour.
Three people died in the collision which resulted, and the drunken
driver was convicted of second degree murder. The accused con-
tended that, as he was" completely under the influence of whiskey at
the time of the accident, he could not have had the malice, express
or implied, necessary to a conviction of murder. The Supreme Court
held that one who wilfully drinks intoxicating liquor, and then know-
ingly drives an automobile while drunk in a reckless and dangerous
manner, with knowledge of the peril thus created toward persons
using the highway, will be held to have the intent necessary to support
a conviction for murder. Here the court is adopting a rule which
states that an act is done with malice if "done with knowledge of such
circumstances that according to common experience there is a plain
and strong likelihood that death will follow the contemplated act."7
The court is in effect adopting the definition of Professor Perkins that
malice, where factual homicidal intent is lacking, is found in "a man-
endangering state of mind."s Authority, reason and public policy all
seem to justify the court's position.
Larceny: Two very interesting cases, turning on the basic definition
and elements of larceny were decided by the Supreme Court in 1953-54.
In Cook v. State9 the defendant sold timber to X for about $80.00. X's
secretary made an error in computation and made out a check payable
to defendant for about $800.00, and X signed and delivered the check
to defendant without noticing the error. Although there was evidence
that defendant was aware of the error as the check was being made
out, this fact cannot be taken to have been established. Defendant
immediately took the check to the drawee bank and cashed it. The
Supreme Court found that the defendant knew at the time that he
cashed the check that he was receiving too much money, and that he
6. 265 S.W.2d 559 (Tenn. 1954).
7. Holmes, C.J., in Commonwealth v. Chance, 174 Mass. 245, 252, 54 N.E.
551, 554 (1899).
8. Perkins, A Re-Examination of Malice Aforethought, 43 YALE L. J. 537, 557
(1934).
9. 264 S.W.2d 571 (Tenn. 1954).
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intended to keep the money for his own use when he got it. A con-
viction of larceny was sustained. The court considered the case as
simply involving the question as to whether or not there was a felo-
nious taking of the money when the defendant cashed the check. In
reaching an airmative conclusion the court relied upon a Florida
case, Sapp v. State,10 wherein the accused, seeking to cash a check
for some $40.00, was through error handed over $4000.00 by the bank
teller. The Florida court held that one is guilty of a felonious taking
if he receives money which he knows is being delivered to him under
a mistake, and if he has the intent to convert the money to his own
use. This rule is in accord with the better reasoned cases throughout
the country. However, it is submitted that there are certain critical
distinctions between the Sapp case and Cook v. State which should
have been considered by the court: (1) Sapp was receiving money
which in the absence of error on the part of the delivering bank he
would not have received; he was thus taking the bank's money with
felonious intent at the time he took it. Cook, on the other hand, re-
ceived from the bank only the sum called for by a duly executed
negotiable instrument. The check was genuine; Cook was not taking
from the bank money which the bank was not supposed to deliver
to him; neither was Cook taking from the bank money which belonged
to the drawer of the check. He was, through the agency of the er-
roneous check, extinguishing a chose in action which the drawer-
depositor held against the drawee bank. The writer is not suggesting
that the defendant is not guilty of larceny under Tennessee statutes;
what is being suggested is that the question in the Cook case was:
"Does one who innocently takes a check which is erroneously drawn
for too great an amount, and who later discovers the mistake, commit
larceny when he cashes the check with intent to convert the money to
his own use?" The answer may be that he is, but such an answer
cannot be reached by reliance upon the admittedly correct rule of
Sapp v. State as clear precedent.
The second larceny case, State v. Nelson," arose under the worthless
check law.12 Accused, with fraudulent intent, obtained a release of
a laborer's and materialman's lien upon a dwelling house, by giving
the lienholder a worthless check. Under the worthless check statute,
the offender must obtain property which may be the subject of lar-
ceny. Thus the question was squarely presented as to whether or not
the release of a lien upon real estate is property which may be the
subject of larceny. The court noted that by statute the common law
purview of larceny may be extended to include instruments evidencing
rights in real property, and it then found that the Tennessee Legis-
10. 157 Fla. 605, 26 So. 2d 646 (1946).
11. 195 Tenn. 441, 260 S.W.2d 170 (1953).
12. TENN. CODE ANN. § 11157 (Williams Supp. 1952).
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lature had done just this. The statute in question provides that "Any
person who shall feloniously steal ... any ... release . . .shall be
punished. . ."13 The court reasons that this language necessarily
places a release in the category of things which may be feloniously
stolen, and therefore within the kinds of property which may be the
subject of larceny. Assuming that the term "feloniously steal" is
synonymous with "commit larceny of"' 4 the reasoning of the court
seems sound. Certainly the case comes within the spirit of the worth-
less check statute, and to so interpret the two statutes does no violence
to established canons of statutory interpretation.
Rape: At common law a woman could not, by the nature of the
offense, commit the crime of rape, but she could be guilty as a principal
in the second degree or accessory by aiding, abetting or counseling a
man in its commission.15 Under a Tennessee statute0 aiders and
abettors in any criminal offense shall be deemed principal offenders.
Therefore, any female who aids and abets a male in the perpetration
of the crime of rape is subject to indictment and conviction of rape.
The Tennessee Supreme Court so held in Bryson v. State.'7
Public Drunkenness: There is no necessary connection between the
offense of public drunkenness and the commission of acts which
amount to a public nuisance. The offense is complete when one ap-
pears in public in a drunken condition. Thus, said the Supreme Court
in Inman v. State,1 8 a conviction will be sustained, even though there
is no allegation or proof of any offensive conduct on the part of the
accused, aside from the simple fact of his being drunk in a public
place.
Selling Beer without a Permit: In McBride v. State0 the facts
showed that one Holly obtained a permit to sell beer in an inn which
he operated for the defendant. Later defendant took over operation
of the inn personally and continued to sell beer under authority of
the permit issued to Holly. The court ruled that a beer permit is not
assignable and sustained a conviction for selling beer without a permit.
The decision seems clearly correct in the light of the commonly under-
stood purpose of the beer permit statute.20 In the exercise of the police
power over an occupation intimately concerned with the public wel-
fare, beer boards issue permits to a particular person for a particular
place. Both the place and the person must meet the approval of the
licensing body. It is not permissible for a permittee to use his permit
13. TENN. CODE ANN. § 10936 (Williams 1934).
14. The term Stealing "imports, ex vi termini, nearly the same as larceny."
BOUVIER, LAW DIcTIoNARY 1132 (Baldwin ed. 1940).
15. MILLER, CRUmiNAL LAW 300 (1934).
16. TENN. CODE ANN. § 10758 (Williams 1934).
17. 195 Tenn. 313, 259 S.W.2d 535 (1953).
18. 195 Tenn. 303, 259 S.W.2d 531 (1953).
19. 195 Tenn. 308, 259 S.W.2d 533 (1953).
20. TENN. CODE ANN. § 1191.14 (Williams Supp. 1952).
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at a different place than that designated in the permit,21 and neither
should it be permissible for a different person than he who is named
in the permit to sell at the permitted place.
Removal of Mortgaged Property from State: In Miller v. State
22
the defendant was convicted of violating the Tennessee statute which
provides that "No maker of any registered mortgage . . .upon per-
sonalty shall move beyond the limits of the state any property em-
braced in and covered by said mortgage ... without the written con-
sent of the holder of the indebtedness secured .... -23 The mortgage
executed by defendant had not been registered at the time the property
was removed from the state. The Supreme Court reversed the convic-
tion, holding that the registration of the mortgage must precede the
removal of the property. The court recognized that this decision
might open the door to deliberate fraud on the part of a mortgagor
who could obtain a loan and execute a mortgage after the county
register's office had closed for the day, and could then immediately
remove the property from the state without criminal liability. It is
submitted that the legislature might well guard against this fraudulent
practice by amending the statute to provide that removal of mortgaged
property from the state without permission within a limited number
of days after execution of the mortgage is a criminal offense, whether
or not the mortgage was registered at the time of removal.
PROcEDURAL LAW
Searches and Seizures: The more significant cases dealing with the
Tennessee law of search and seizure are dealt with elsewhere in this
Survey.24 A few other cases should be noted here. In Kizer v. Ward2 5
Tennessee officers, acting on information supplied to them, witnessed
a truck being loaded with liquor under suspicious circumstances in
Cairo, Illinois. They followed the truck into Tennessee and stopped
it. The driver had no shipping documents as required by Tennessee
statute.26 The Commissioner of Finance and Taxation confiscated the
truck and cargo. The court upheld the commissioner, on the ground
that the officers had reasonable grounds to believe that a felony was
being committed in their presence. As the officers knew that the truck
was loaded with whiskey, they had a right to stop it to determine if
its documents were in order, and under the statute the driver cannot
21. Sowell v. Red. 192 Tenn. 681, 241 S.W.2d 775 (1951); Tucker v. Carter
County Beer Bd., 191 Tenn. 210, 232 S.W.2d 38 (1950).
22. 195 Tenn. 181, 258 S.W.2d 751 (1953).
23. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1951, c. 243, § 1; TENN. CODE A:n. § 10971.1 (Williams
Supp. 1952).
24. Morgan, Procedure and Evidence-1954 Survey, infra p. 895 at 903.
25. 195 Tenn. 200, 258 S.W.2d 759 (1953).
26. The Tennessee statute requires among other things that the driver of
a vehicle transporting liquor through Tennessee must have a bill of lading or
memorandum of cargo, indicating the consignor and consignee. TENN. CODE
AxNu. § 6648.17 (Williams Supp. 1952).
1954]
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complain of being thus stopped, since he has a duty to exhibit the
necessary documents to the proper authorities upon demand. The
statute supports no inference that demand shall be made only when
there is suspicion of criminal acts. When an official knows that a truck
is loaded with whiskey, he has a right to see if its papers are in order.
The case is quite similar to and in accord with an earlier Tennessee
case, Evans v. Pearson.27
In Jones v. State28 a highway patrolman notified another patrolman
that a certain described automobile was headed toward the second
officer with a big carload of whiskey. The second patrolman recognized
the car and stopped it. He noticed the neck of a bottle of whiskey
protruding from under a blanket in the rear of the car. He arrested
the driver and found over 50 gallons of whiskey in the car. The court
held that the arrest and search were both legal. The rule is well
established that where an officer has reasonable cause to believe that
a felony is being committed in his presence, he may arrest without a
warrant, and a reasonable search incidental to the arrest is valid.20
It is also well established in Tennessee that where an officer stops
a vehicle on the pretext of examining the driver's license of the
operator, and the officer then sees intoxicating liquor in the car he may
not then arrest the driver for illegal possession or transportation of
liquor, nor may he hold him until a proper warrant is obtained. 0
However, where a driver is stopped and is asked to exhibit his driver's
license, if he voluntarily hands over the incriminating materials, he
cannot complain that he was unreasonably searched.2' And where, as
in Burns v. City of Nashville,"2 the driver is arrested for a traffic
violation, if in answer to an officer's question he voluntarily discloses
that he is transporting intoxicating liquor, no problem of illegal search
arises, since no search is involved.
Although the Tennessee Supreme Court has shown that it has no
sympathy for the law violator whose property is confiscated as an
incident to his arrest and conviction of dealing in the illegal liquor
27. 193 Tenn. 528, 246 S.W.2d 964 (1951).
28. 195 Tenn. 390, 259 S.W.2d 864 (1953).
29. This rule is supported by numerous Tennessee cases cited by the court.
For a more complete analysis of the right to arrest and search without war-
rants, see Perkins, The Tennessee Law of Arrest, 2 V~n. L. Rsv. 509, 577, 614-
24 (1949).
30. Murphy v. State, 194 Tenn. 698, 254 S.W.2d 556 (1953); Robertson v.
State, 184 Tenn. 277, 198 S.W.2d 633 (1947); Smith v. State, 182 Tenn. 158, 184
S.W.2d 390 (1945); Cox v. State, 181 Tenn. 344, 181 S.W.2d 338 (1944).
31. Acklen v. State, 267 S.W.2d 101 (Tenn. 1954).
32. 261 S.W.2d 149 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1953). Note that this case was de-
cided in the Court of Appeals. A proceeding brought by a city for violation
of. a city ordinance is a civil action. Deitch v. City of Chattanooga, 195 Tenn.
245, 258 S.W.2d 776 (1953).
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traffic,3 3 the confiscating authority must proceed strictly according to
law. In Range Pontiac Sales Co. v. Dickinson3 4 a sheriff confiscated
a bootlegger's automobile, but failed to give a receipt and failed to
turn the automobile over to the Department of Finarice and Taxation
within the time provided by the statute.35 The court held that the
confiscation was not good. True, the contest was between lienholders
and the commissioner, but under the findings of the court the lien-
holder stood in no better position than the bootlegger, so that had
there been no lien the court's holding would apparently require that
the automobile be returned to the owner.
Jurisdiction of Courts: In State v. Lusky3" the defendant was ar-
rested under a criminal warrant issued out of the Davidson County
Court of General Sessions. Before the case was heard the attorney
general entered a nolle prosequi, and on the same day the prosecutor
obtained a presentment before the grand jury against the defendant.
Defendant contested the jurisdiction of the circuit court on the ground
that the sessions court had exclusive jurisdiction. The Supreme Court
had no difficulty in concluding that the general sessions court is not a
court of coordinate jurisdiction with the circuit court, and the attorney
general is free to enter a nolle prosequi in the lower court at any time
before jeopardy attaches without prejudice to the authority of the
grand jury or to the jurisdiction of the circuit court to deal with the
defendant subsequently.
Juries: In England v. State3 7 a third defendant was included in the
trial after six jurors had been selected to try the first two defendants.
These jurors were allowed to disperse before the trial resumed with
the additional defendant. The new party challenged one of the six
jurors, and the remaining five were allowed to sit on the case without
objection by any of the defendants. Upon their conviction, the first
two defendants claimed that the verdict was vitiated by reason of the
fact that the jury were allowed to disperse during the trial. The court
went to some length to show that dispersal of the jury will vitiate a
verdict in Tennessee, but that the court does not approve of the rule
in non-capital cases; the court then sustained the verdict on the ground
that the trial began anew after the dispersal, and the five jurors were
selected anew. This would indicate that the Supreme Court might
be prepared to overrule the old Tennessee rule as to the effect of dis-
persal in non-capital cases if a case were squarely presented to it.
However, upon petition to rehear the court so emphatically stated
33. See Kizer v. Ward, supra note 25.
34. 195 Tenn. 228, 258 S.W.2d 770 (1953).
35. TxNN. CODE ANN. § 6648.24 (Williams Supp. 1952).
36. 267 S.W.2d 106 (Tenn. 1954).
37. 264 S.W.2d 815 (Tenn. 1954).
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that it did not intend to overrule the previous cases on the point that
one is at a loss to understand why the court saw fit to express its dis-
approval of the existing rule at all. The case could have been decided
without more than a passing reference to an inapplicable rule. It
contributes only to confusion in the law when a court by way of dictum
criticizes an existing rule and then emphatically denies any intention
to depart from it.
Extradition: The case of State ex rel. Bryant v. Fleming38 presented
the question of the right of Tennessee to arrest and extradite to an-
other state a fugitive who was not in the demanding state when the
alleged offense occurred. The fugitive was charged in Indiana with
the offense of non-support of a minor child. The Supreme Court stated
that Tennessee would not have had authority to extradite the fugitive
under these circumstances prior to the enactment of the Uniform
Reciprocal Support Act 39 and the 1950 Supplement to the Tennessee
Code.40 The court took judicial notice that Indiana has adopted a
substantially similar statute.
The *alleged offense occurred prior to the date of the enactment by
the Tennessee Legislature of the relevant statutes. The court ruled
in what seems to be a correct interpretation that these statutes are
procedural in nature, and that procedural law as of the time of the
demand, rather than as of the time of the commission of the offense,
will control.
Evidence: Though naked possession of beer will not support an
inference of a purpose of sale,41 the surrounding circumstances may be
such as to support an inference that the beer is held for sale, and thus
to sustain a conviction of illegal possession of beer for the purpose of
sale. The Supreme Court so held in Farmer v. State,42 where the
surrounding circumstances were that, in addition to possessing 23
cases of beer, all of which was refrigerated or on ice, defendant had
near the beer a cigar box in which were several dollars in currency
and change, and there were several stacks of half-dollars in an ad-
joining room.
Tennessee's Age of Consent statute43 provides that no one shall be
convicted of the offense on the unsupported testimony of the female
in question. In Binnion v. State44 the only corroborative evidence
38. 195 Tenn. 419, 260 S.W.2d 161 (1953).
39. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1951, c. 234.
40. TENN. CODE SUPP. § 11935.5 (1950).
41. Beasley v. State, 193 Tenn. 327, 246 S.W.2d 32 (1951).
42. 265 S.W.2d 555 (Tenn. 1954).
43. TENN. CODE AxN. § 10786 (Williams 1934).
44. 264 S.W.2d 795 (Tenn. 1954).
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consisted of the testimony of three witnesses who testified that the
defendant had courted the complaining female for a period apparently
terminating some nine and one-half months prior to the birth of her
child. None of these witnesses offered anything to suggest any im-
propriety in the relationship between defendant and prosecutrix. The
Supreme Court reversed the conviction and held that the evidence
offered was not sufficient corroboration of the prosecutrix' testimony.
Although there is language in the earlier case of Ross v. State4 5 to the
effect that the relations of the parties and their opportunities for meet-
ing may be shown in corroboration, an examination of this case reveals
that the'supporting testimony at least raised an inference of improper
conduct.40 Any other holding than that of the court in the Binnion
case would render the corroboration requirement virtually meaning-
less.
Notwithstanding the various Women's Emancipation Acts it is still
true that articles found on residential premises are presumed to belong
to the husband as head of the family.47 However, this is a rebuttable
presumption which may be overcome, by proof of circumstances in-
dicating possession on the part of the wife. Thus in Morrison v. State48
officers searched premises and found under the wife's wardrobe a
trapdoor which led to a cache of whiskey. The defendant wife was
present at the time and did not deny that she was owner of the whis-
key; indeed, she remarked that she had been expecting a raid. These
circumstances were held sufficient to overcome the presumption of
possession in the husband, and were sufficient to sustain a conviction
of the wife for unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor.
Determination of Sanity of Accused: In Ross v. State,49 defendant
was confined to Western State Hospital for the Insane at the time of
trial. By what authority he was committed to the hospital does not
appear in the opinion. Defendant's attorneys submitted affidavits to
the trial court to the effect that their client could not go to trial on a
manslaughter charge because of his physical and mental condition.
Despite this objection the trial was held and defendant was convicted.
On appeal the Supreme Court did not reverse the conviction but post-
poned execution of the judgment until it could obtain the certificate
of a competent psychiatrist as to the competence of defendant to advise
with counsel and to testify in his own behalf. After obtaining this
45. 130 Tenn. 387, 185 S.W. 1073 (1914).
46. The correspondence between the parties was "vibrant with sexual
emotion." Id. at 395.
47. Crocker v. State, 148 Tenn. 106, 251 S.W. 914 (1922).
48. 263 S.W.2d 504 (Tenn. 1953).
49. 265 S.W.2d 553 (Tenn. 1954).
19541
834 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [VOL. 7
certificate the Supreme Court will decide whether to execute the
judgment or to order a new trial. In this way the Supreme Court is
performing a function normally exercised by the trial jury-that of
determining the sanity of the defendant. This may well be dangerous
precedent. The appellate court is assuming a basic fact-finding func-
tion, and the trial court is encouraged to proceed with a trial without
requiring the issue of sanity to be determined by the trial jury.
